Gilbert Ryle, Rene Descartes & The Paramechanical Hypothesis
In 1949, Skinner published his Opuscule [1] 'verbal behaviour', the event upon which a young Noam Chomsky used as a career springboard. But in that year, Gilbert Ryle also published his Magnum opus, 'Consciousness'. It would be over 30 years until a comparable publication about that topic would see the light of day[2]
In the figure above, all the elements for a complete GOLEM are shown in their latest assumed-correct anatomical juxtaposition [4]. Note the interesting consequences of subjective (properly: intra-subjective) and objective (properly: extra-subjective, or, perhaps equivalently, inter-subjective) phenomenality classes. The RCH contains the representational data structures (RDS's) of the embodied self. There can only be one embodied self, otherwise a etymologically schizophrenic (vs clinically schizoid) situation would exist, leading to either a frozen state of indecision or a goal-less action zombie. This leads to the customary assumption that the RCH leads with the original 'self' and the LCH follows with the other 'selves'. When there is exclusively ONE self, we must avoid ambiguous copies, so multiple copies of it can only entail a historical record of oneself's developmental stages located in the RCH. This leads to the existence of an exclusively TIME based memory area. However, when there can be MULTIPLE other selves, and we must avoid ambiguous copies, multiple copies of it can only entail a geographical record of the other selves the subjective self has personally or thematically/ epistemologically known located in the LCH (eg we all know who Santa is, though none of us have actually met him, nor ever expect to). This leads to the existence of an exclusively SPACE based memory area.
There are two cerebral hemispheres which are almost identical. However, for subjectivity to work, one hemisphere must predominate. This is almost always the RCH. When we are infants, we develop our own sense of self by translating between what situations feel like (using our RCH) and what they look like (using our LCH). For this to work in social (multi-self) contexts, our minds must have evolved by adopting the 'minimal default assumption'- ie that others have very similar internal functions to our own. Consequently, being able to view ourselves objectively, via the RCH --> LCH transformation, allows us to model the external views of others, and therefore (by extension) be able to empathize with them- i.e. model what they must be feeling. Symbolically, we propose that (RCH --> LCH) self =>> (LCH --> RCH) other.
That is, for a given embodied state of self E(0) in the RCH, we can recognise the matching situated state(s) [5] of self S(0) in the LCH. But because we all closely resemble each other, architectonically speaking (ie on a species level), it is also possible to go the other way, ie to match the situated state of the proximate other S(1) to their embodied state E(1). This is the basis of 'situational empathy', the involuntary like-mindedness of people who face similar predicaments (situational challenges).
Behaviour and Situation - the coathanger vs the clothes
Consider the figure immediately above. Also consider the following analogy- that the personality (character traits without memory) is the coathanger and the behaviour is the clothes. Averaged over the species, we can speak of a standard (c.f. normal distribution) personality, so behaviour changes only to suit the situation, once we adopt this statistical 'kludge'. Therefore we can posit that mental state (= knowledge + memory) is an accumulation of behaviour plans (knowledge) plus situation plots (memories). But once you know the situation/ stimulus, you can predict the behaviour/ response [6], on average.
Why this is important, is that later, when we claim that language is an externalised form of behaviour planning, we will also claim that syntax and semantics have inherited their differential::cumulative relationship from internal mental models of behaviour and state, as per the figure above.
1. Skinner, B'F. (1949) Verbal Behaviour. FYI, etymologically speaking, opuscule is the preferred antonym to magnum opus.
2. Dennett, Daniel (1981) Consciousness Explained. MIT Press
2. as popularised by Australian philosopher, and my fellow Flinders University alumnus, Professor David Chalmers.
3. discovered by Endel Tulving, Canadian CogSci Nobel laureate
4. Hi! almost there. There is enough detail in this latest figure for a clever person to build clones of these monsters and conquer the world with a clone army.
5. We must admit to the possibility of multiple situated states for each embodied state, one for each person we know.
6. we humbly request the reader's indulgence that we be permitted to drop into behaviourist parlance occasionally, should the circumstance allow it.